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CITY COURT, WATERTOWN
People v. Rogers'
(decided January 12, 2000)
The defendant, Ralph Rogers, was charged with violating
New York Agriculture and Markets Law § 353 ("NYAML
§ 353).2 The defendant claimed that § 3533 was
unconstitutionally vague, pursuant to the due process guarantees of
both the Fourteenth Amendment 4 of the United States Constitution
and Article I, § 6 of the New York State Constitution,5 on the
ground that "a person of common intelligence could not ascertain
what conduct is proscribed by the wording of the statue." 6  In
addition, the defendant claimed that the use of the terms
"unjustifiably" 7 and "unjustifiable," 8 as a means of determining
criminal conduct, did not refer to the defense of justification.9 The
City Court of New York, Watertown, ruled in favor of the
defendant, holding that,
based on the facts of this case involving the docking
of a dog's tail, Agriculture and Markets Law
§ 350(2) and § 353 'as applied' to the defendant,
violate the due process guarantees of both the
'183 Misc. 2d 538, 703 N.Y.S.2d 891, (2000).
2 Id. at 539, 703 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
3 N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. § 353 (2000). The statute provides in pertinent part:
"[a] person who... injustifiably injures, maims, mutilates or kills any
animal ... is guilty of a misdemeanor ..... " Id.
4 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: ". . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law .... Id
5 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This section provides in pertinent part: "No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." Id.
6Rogers, 183 Misc. 2d at 539, 703 N.Y.S.2 at 892.
7 N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. § 353. The term "unjustifiably" is used to describe the
criminal conduct for which a person may be found guilty of a misdemeanor. Id.
8 N.Y. AGRIC. & MK'rs. § 350 (2000). The term "unjustifiable" is used to
describe the type of physical pain that constitutes "torture" or "cruelty."
Paragraph 2 of the statute provides "'torture' or 'cruelty' includes every act,
omission, or neglect, whereby unjustifiable physical pain, suffering or death is
caused or permitted." Id.
9 Rogers, 183 Misc. 2d at 539, 703 N.Y.S.2d at 892; see also N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 35.05 (1999), which provides that, under certain circumstances, as provided by
the statute, "conduct which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable
and not criminal." Id.
1
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Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Article I, § 6 of the New York
Constitution. The court based its decision on the
fact that the vagueness of the terms 'unjustifiable'
and 'unjustifiably' used to define when the common
conduct of tail docking becomes criminal conduct.'
0
A neighbor of the defendant, Ralph Rogers, had selected a
particular puppy to purchase from the defendant on May 21,
1999."1 The defendant agreed to sell her the puppy. 12 Afterwards,
the neighbor became concerned about the condition of the puppy's
tail area. 13 Prior to selling the puppy, the defendant had used a
rubber band on the puppy's tail in order to dock the tail. 14 The
purchaser took the puppy to a local animal shelter on May 22,
1999, due to the condition of the tail, where the puppy was kept
under observation. 15 Two days later, the puppy was taken to a
veterinarian, where it was determined that the puppy had to be
euthanized. 16 As a result, the defendant was charged with violating
NYAML § 353. 17 However, the defendant argued that he believed
that it was all right to dock his puppy's tail himself.18
Before determining the constitutionality of the statute, the
first issue the court decided was that of justification. 19 It first
turned to New York Penal Law § 35.05,20 which is the statute that
pertained to the defense of justification. The statute states that,
"when a person, then, knows the conduct is an offense before
engaging in it and nonetheless feels justified in engaging in it, then
once charged with the offense the person can raise the justification
defense.",21 This requires that the defendant actually know what
1o Rogers, 183 Misc. 2d at 544, 703 N.Y.S.2d at 896.




5s Rogers, 183 Misc. 2d at 539, 703 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
6 Id., 703 N.Y.S.2d at 892-93.
17 Id. at 539, 703 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
18 Id.
'9 Id. at 540, 703 N.Y.S.2d at 893.
20 Rogers, 183 Misc. 2d at 539, 703 N.Y.S.2d at 892; See also N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 35.05, supra note 9.
21 Rogers, 183 Misc. 2d at 540, 703 N.Y.S.2d at 893.
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the statute prohibits, and engage in the proscribed conduct anyway,
because he feels that he is justified.22 The defendant claimed that
"the words 'unjustifiably' and 'unjustifiable' are too vague
constitutionally to fairly apprise one of what conduct the statute
prohibits., 23  The court held that the terms "unjustifiable" and
"unjustified" are "not specifically used to refer to the defense of
justification under Penal Law § 35.02, but rather to set a verbal
boundary between acceptable infliction of physical pain, suffering
or death and/or the maiming or mutilation of an animal and when a
person's conduct exceeds such boundary."
24
Next, the court discussed the constitutional vagueness
issue, by stating that, "vagueness challenges to statutes which do
not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in light
of the facts of the case at hand. 25 The defendant argued that the
terms "unjustifiable" and "unjustifiably," in NYAML § 350(2) and
§ 353, violated the Due Process Clause because the statutes failed
to give adequate notice that docking a dog's tail by using a rubber
band was proscribed by the statute.
26
In another New York case, People v. Bright,27 the
constitutionality of a statute concerning loitering was at issue.
28
The defendant was arrested by a police officer at a platform of the
Long Island Railroad. 29 The officer inquired as to whether he was
going to take the 'train or whether he had money to purchase a
ticket. 30 Based on the defendant's reply in the negative, he was
arrested for loitering, pursuant to Penal law § 240.35. 3 1 The Court




25 Rogers, 183 Misc. 2d at 539, 703 N.Y.S.2d at 892. See also United States v.
Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975); Maynard v. Carwritght, 486 U.S. 356
(1988).
16 Id. at 540, 703 N.Y.S.2d at 893.
27 People v. Bright, 71 N.Y.2d 376, 520 N.E.2d 1355, 526 N.Y.S.2d 66 (1988).




31 Id. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.35(7) (2000) provides in pertinent part: "A
person is guilty of loitering when he loiters or remains in any transportation
facility, or is found sleeping therein, and is unable to give a satisfactory
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"unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clauses of the
Federal and State Constitutions because it fails to give fair notice
to the ordinary citizen that the prohibited conduct is illegal, it lacks
minimal legislative guidelines, thereby permitting arbitrary
enforcement and, finally, it requires that a citizen relinquish his
constitutional right against compulsory self-incrimination in order
to avoid arrest." ,2 In making this determination, the court reasoned
that the Legislature is presumed to be valid and the heavy burden
of demonstrating that a statute is unconstitutional lies with the
party seeking to invalidate the statute.33  In order to meet this
burden, the court applied a well settled two-pronged analysis to
determine the constitutionality of a statute.
34
"First, the statute must provide sufficient notice of what
conduct is prohibited; second, the statute must not be written in
such a manner as to permit or encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement." 35 The court in the present case relied
heavily on the analysis of the Bright court concerning the first
prong of the inquiry. The Bright court noted that this requirement,
is necessary because "no man shall be held criminally responsible
for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be
proscribed., 36 This provides for basic fairness and due process,
which requires that a statute must be definite in its terms, so a
person of ordinary intelligence has fair notice that his acts, or
contemplated acts, are forbidden by the statute.37 "For this reason,
under our State and Federal Constitutions, the Legislature may not
criminalize conduct that is inherently innocent merely because
such conduct is 'sometimes attended by improper motives,' since
to do so would not fairly inform the ordinary citizen that an
otherwise innocent act is illegal. 38
32 Bright, 71 N.Y.2d at 378, 520 N.E.2d at 1356, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 67.




17 Bright, 71 N.Y.2d at 382-83, 520 N.E.2d at 1358, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 69.
38 Id. at 383, 520 N.E.2d at 1358, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 69. See also People v. Bunis
9 N.Y.2d 1, 4 (1961) (stating that "[the] Legislature may not validly make it a
crime to do something which is innocent in itself merely because it is sometimes
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In the present case, the term "unjustified" created an
ambiguity in the statute. The term means that there is physical
injury caused by maiming or mutilation that may be justifiable,
such as the clipping of a dog's ears, for which guidelines are
provided for in NYAML § 365(l). 39 However, it was not clear if
conduct not specifically proscribed or prescribed by the statute
constituted an unjustifiable or justifiable act.40 The statute under
review was silent as to whether the docking of a dog's tail was
prohibited, or if there were certain procedures to follow when
clipping the tail.4 1  Therefore, it was not necessary for the
defendant to take the dog to the veterinarian. "The act of docking
a dog's tail does not require . . . professional supervision, so an
ordinary person of common intelligence is only required to avoid
'unjustifiable physical pain' and 'suffering' when engaging in such
conduct. 42 The court reasoned that if the legislature wanted to
proscribe a certain conduct, such as docking a dog's tail, then it
should have stated so explicitly.43 The words "unjustifiably" and
"unjustifiable" were unconstitutionally vague, in relation to
docking a dog's tail, and were in violation of the Due Process
Clause because a reasonable person in the defendant's
circumstances would not have notice that his conduct placed him at
risk of violating the law.44
In comparison, the federal courts use the same requirement
of notice, and the reasonableness standard, when analyzing a
statute that is alleged to be unconstitutionally vague. 5 In
39 Rogers, 183 Misc. 21 at 542, 703 N.Y.S.2d at 894. See also N.Y. AGRIC. &
MKTS. § 365 (1) (2000), which provides in pertinent part: "Whoever clips or
cuts off or causes or procures another to clip or cut off the whole or any part of
an ear of any dog unless an anaesthetic shall have been given to the dog and the
operation performed by a licensed veterinarian, is guilty of a misdemeanor...
Id.40 Rogers, 183 Misc. 2d at 542, 703 N.Y.S.2d at 894.
41id.
42 Id. at 542, 703 N.Y.S.2d at 894-95.
43 Id. at 545, 703 N.Y.S.2d at 896.
44Id.
45 See Smith v. Gogeun, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974) (stating that "[d]ue process
requires that all 'be informed as to what the State commands or forbids,' and
that 'men of common intelligence' not be forced to guess at the meaning of the
criminal law."); see also Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361 (1988)
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Maynard v. Cartwright,46 Mr. and Mrs. Riddle were attacked by
the defendant, whom Mrs. Riddle recognized as a disgruntled
employee.47 Mrs. Riddle was shot twice in the legs and Mr. Riddle
was killed.48 Mrs. Riddle dragged herself to a telephone, however
the defendant then slit her throat and stabbed her twice with a
hunting knife the Riddles had given him for Christmas.49  The
defendant then left the house and Mrs. Riddle, who survived the
incident, called the police.5 0  The defendant was tried and
convicted of first-degree murder and the jury imposed the death
penalty. 51 The jury found that the defendant met two of the three
statutory aggravating circumstances to impose the death penalty;
"first, the defendant 'knowingly created a great risk of death to
more than one person'; second, the murder was 'especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel.' ' 52  It was the second of these
statutory circumstances that the defendant argued was
unconstitutionally vague.
53
The court found that "if there are circumstances that any
reasonable person would recognize as covered by the statute, it is
not unconstitutionally vague even if the language would fail to
give adequate notice that it covered other circumstances as well.",
54
Like the state court view, it is necessary to look at the individual
facts of the case, in order to make that determination. One of the
concerns that the court raised, which was also recognized in the
Bright case, is that of arbitrary enforcement. 56 The court stated
that "a person of ordinary sensibility could fairly characterize
lack of notice, and hence may be overcome in any specific case where
reasonable persons would know that their conduct is at risk."); U.S. v. Powell,
423 U.S. 87, 92 (1975) (holding that, "[t]he [defendant] has been given clear
notice that a reasonably ascertainable standard of conduct is mandated; it is for
him to insure that his actions do not fall outside the legal limits").
46 486 U.S. 356 (1988).




51 Maynard, 486 U.S. at 358-59
52 id.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 361.
55 Id.56 Maynard, 486 U.S. at 363.
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almost every murder as 'outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible
and inhuman.' 57 The court held that the words used in the statute
gave the jury no guidance and the 's interpretation of the
circumstances could only be speculation.58 The court stated that an
ordinary person could honestly believe that every murder is
"especially heinous." 59 Therefore, because the statute could be
used arbitrarily, the court held that the statute was
unconstitutionally vague.
60
In conclusion, both the state courts and the federal courts
deal with the issue of unconstitutionally vague statutes in the same
manner. First, if the vagueness challenge to the statute does not
involve First Amendment freedoms, it must be examined in light
of the facts of the case at hand.6' In other words, a statute is not
considered unconstitutionally vague on its face, but may be
considered unconstitutionally vague when taken in light of the
circumstances on a case by case basis. Secondly, due process
requires the statute to be sufficiently definite in its terms, "so as to
give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his
contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute." 62 This allows a
reasonable person of ordinary intelligence to be able to understand
and appreciate the statute, and make a decision as to whether to
adhere to, or violate the statute. It also allows a court, judge, jury,
police officer, etc., to refrain from enforcing the statute arbitrarily
or discriminatorily. 63 Therefore, the legislature must incorporate
the conduct that is prescribed or proscribed in each statute so there





60 Id. at 365-66.
6 1 Rogers, 183 Misc. 2d at 540, 703 N.Y.S.2d at 893.
62 Id. at 541, 703 N.Y.S.2d at 894.
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